Usman Thakor, a security expert and former commander in the Indian army. “Some things are only available to you,” he says. “The Indian national security apparatus doesn’t have an appetite for it,” he adds, “even if the price is justifiable.” It’s this hunger that Mr Raj Thackeray describes in a recent article for The Indian Express. He refers to the Indian army’s preference for technology in a world of sophisticated enemies. The article is titled, “India’s Army of the 21st Century”. By “the 21st Century” Mr Thackeray means the next two decades.

By comparison, the Indian army’s current arsenal of weapons is less sophisticated and is largely geared towards the current and future tasks of that security apparatus. In Mr Thackeray’s own words, they aim to “contain and neutralise” threats to the country. So-called nuclear weapons are at the heart of their arsenal. That is to say, the Indian army does not feel much need for their use. The nuclear arsenal includes the Indian version of the American B61 – the B61-10. The country has deployed nuclear warheads in two of its submarines and has the capability to deliver them without being detected in the sea. The country’s first nuclear weapon, called the Agni-V, was tested in 1974. It is a medium-range missile which can carry a nuclear warhead of up to 13 kilotons. But only one of the warheads on its first stage is capable of striking a target. The second stage carries a larger warhead that can carry a nuclear warhead of up to 17 kilotons.

Mr Thackeray points out that the country currently has a nuclear deterrent with three short-range ballistic missiles. A fourth, the Arihant, is under development and is supposed to make it easier for India to strike and intercept its enemies. That’s not the only reason for the reliance on technological warfare, Mr Thackeray argues. He points out that the enemy often knows more than he believes or better yet, knows he is already in touch and ready to counter. “You are either fighting a hard fight or you are already out,” he warns.

Notwithstanding the lack of conventional capabilities and the cost of their use, Mr Thackeray says, the Indian army’s desire to be the “first choice” in this technological offensive is understandable. He makes a very good point though by adding that it