Ruth Ahmed (M.B.A., City College)

The most fundamental difference between people with and without mental illness is the difference between their thoughts and the way they react to thoughts. This paper presents how the idea that people with mental illness have dysfunctional mindsets comes into conflict with neuroscience research on the workings of the central nervous system and in particular the prefrontal cortex. Although mental illness has generally been treated with pharmacological and psychosocial strategies focusing on specific symptoms, there has been some debate of whether or not people with mental illness have brain structures different than the brain of people without such health issues. We argue that the debate has resulted from limited understanding of the structure and connectivity of the prefrontal cortex, a structure thought to be of critical significance in understanding mental illness. We introduce the idea that dysfunction of brain function in individuals with mental illness leads to abnormal mental models of thoughts and the way they are manifested by the way in which those models interact with the world around them. We demonstrate that abnormalities in the way that the frontal cortex and other structures relate to the way thoughts relate to the world can lead to the manifestation of distorted mental representations or inattention. We conclude by suggesting that the use of social support that engages people in thinking through the idea, and providing them with tools to practice it, is critical to the successful treatment of people with mental illness.

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J.M.G. (2015). The Cognitive and Social Origins of the ‘Social Brain’ and Mental Illness. Annual Review of Psychology, 62(1): 151–180.

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship of cognitive flexibility, a cognitive skill that has been strongly associated with mental health, to mental illness, focusing on mental illness as distinct from affective disorders. We argue that mental disorders emerge as a result of cognitive vulnerability rather than an underlying vulnerability in mental flexibility. We suggest that this mental flexibility-mood-stress connection is central to understanding the pathophysiology of mental disorders, particularly mental illness. Through a series of meta-analytic studies, we show that individuals who are more able to adapt to change in cognitive, emotional, moral, or social environments have higher levels of depression and anxiety, and lower levels of self‐efficacy and the ability to regulate negative emotions. The relationships among cognitive flexibility, affect, mood, and self‐efficacy are significant and stable across studies and across a range of mental states. While we focus primarily in