Abubakar Magar, The Unspeakable, 664 P.2d 1627, 1638
The judgment of the jury on defendant was for conviction of the murder charge, but the jury could not unanimously decide to convict defendant. Under the Sixth Amendment, the jury could only sentence the defendant to death for the murder charge. After sentencing, defendant was given an opportunity to have his statements of defense reviewed by the court of appeals.
The court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari reversing and vacating judgment. In doing so, it emphasized that because the death penalty does not violate the Constitution, the case does not involve federal constitutional imperatives.
The trial court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus did not violate the constitutional requirement that the cause of action for a constitutional violation be brought within 1/6th the time provided for cases arising under the Constitution. See Burdick v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 264, 278 (1979). The Sixth Amendment right was not “implied for any reason” and “cannot be violated lightly when not stated in an oath” in order to establish a claim of privilege. Id. The Sixth Amendment right of review of judgment is satisfied when the judgment is “arbitrarily, capriciously, or without justiciability.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has held that because a state could not constitutionally deny a defendant the ability to testify against him at trial, no state court can affirm the judgment, even when reviewing a state court’s judgment for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Zerbst, 714 F.2d 993 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 938, 105 S. Ct. 586, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1985).
The evidence at the trial was not sufficient to convict defendant, and the trial court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus on this charge violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Although the court of appeals ruled that defendant could not be given habeas corpus relief, the court in a separate opinion had acknowledged that, even if he was granted such relief, there would be “plenty of other proceedings to pursue.” See Davis v. California, 483 U.S. 807, 812, 107 S. Ct. 2830, 2932, 97 L. Ed. 2d